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Russia’s use of mercenary groups in con ict zones is an increasingly used tool
to gain in uence across Africa. Mercenaries allow Russia to deploy military
forces to bolster autocratic regimes abroad and support regimes who back its
global ambitions. However, these mercenaries lack accountability and allow the
ability to deny military involvement in foreign countries.
A UN report in March 2021 highlighted signi cant Russian-directed mercenary activity
in the ongoing con ict in the Central African Republic (CAR). UN representatives
identi ed several instances where Russian military contractors have assisted the CAR
President Faustin-Archange Touadéra in combatting rebel groups, alongside training
government forces and providing a security attaché for CAR government  gures. The
report identi es Russian mercenaries as engaging in widespread human rights abuses
alongside government forces.
The alarm over Russian mercenary activity in the CAR comes amidst wider concern
regarding Russia’s increasing support for authoritarian regimes across Africa. The use
of mercenary forces – rather than the Russian military or the more ‘traditional’ process
of supplying weapons – provides Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime the scope
to commit human rights violations indiscriminately and circumvent international
restrictions in efforts to support regimes and governments abroad. This presents an
additional challenge for states and agencies in responding to and holding those
involved to account.
Russian mercenaries across the non-Western world
The presence of Russian-based mercenary groups across con ict zones in the non-
Western world is nothing new. Mercenary groups organised by Russian  gures close
to Putin’s government have operated in states as diverse as Libya, Syria, Madagascar
and Sudan.
An important  gure amongst these individuals is Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close associate
of Putin who previously worked within the Kremlin. Prigozhin is widely known as the
individual behind Russia’s ‘troll factory’: the Internet Research Agency. This
organisation has employed hundreds of bloggers to spread online disinformation,
criticise the actions of Western governments and promote favourable opinions of
Putin’s regime. The US government has compiled evidence claiming that Prigozhin
was a central  gure in efforts to interfere in the 2016 US election, and has
subsequently offered a reward for information leading to his arrest.
Prigozhin’s mercenary activities include allegedly operating and funding the Wagner
Group, whose operations vary in both scope and location. Their military contractors
have been employed to guard key Russian installations, agencies and buildings in
Venezuela, alongside more direct instances of combat against Syrian rebels, and have
clashed with US commandos in February 2018 in Syria.
Russia’s diplomatic strategy of gaining autocratic support
Russia’s operations in the CAR stem from a 2017 meeting between President
Touadéra and Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov. Touadéra, facing a UN arms
embargo and continual instability from rebel groups, requested military assistance
from Russia, alongside training for embattled armed forces. The CAR government in
return offered lucrative mining contracts.
Russia’s response to the CAR’s request involved gaining an exemption from the UN
embargo to provide weapons and equipment to its military, but it also crucially
involved the deployment of Wagner mercenaries.
Such deals resonate with the recent growth of reports and scholarly literature
highlighting Russia’s ‘return to Africa’. This return is seen as a similar process to the
support the USSR provided to African regimes throughout the Cold War. What
concerns Western analysts with Russia’s activities is that much of this effort is
expended to bolster and support existing authoritarian regimes across the non-
Western world. Russia does not export democracy or human rights, instead providing
stability for the ruling regime and ful lling other self-interests, such as gaining raw
materials from recipient regimes.
Russia’s autocratic support acts as an effective approach to garner diplomatic allies to
reshape international norms to better suit its authoritarian rule. These links are
apparent in Russia’s dealings with Touadéra’s government, with the objective in the
CAR of gaining favour and diplomatic ties with a former French colony, thereby
severing the country’s ties with France and the EU.
Driving autocratic support without risk or accountability
Russia’s use of the Wagner Group in the CAR and elsewhere is tied to the wider issue
of autocratic support and international accountability. Russia’s use of mercenaries
provides substantial bene ts in achieving the aims of autocratic support, with minimal
risks involved. According to Putin, Wagner operates as an entirely independent
organisation, with a leadership entirely unconnected to Prigozhin and the Russian
government. Prigozhin has claimed Wagner does not even exist.
Such an approach passes the blame – and any activities that Wagner undertakes –
from the Russian state, and crucially shields Putin’s regime from wider international
backlash regarding the use of force abroad. Russian mercenaries, allegedly acting on
the orders of the government, have subsequently been deployed to key strategic
locations such as the Crimea, Syria and across Africa to ful l Russia’s geopolitical
aims without featuring the diplomatic roadblocks of committing state military forces.
Putin’s regime is therefore relatively unscathed in its approach to gain greater
in uence and diplomatic ties abroad. While recipients such as Touadéra’s government
are receiving Russian assistance, there remains a veneer of plausible deniability on
Russia’s side that can be utilised if necessary.
A challenge for democratic actors
The use of private military presents a clear challenge for western democratic states
regarding Russia’s efforts to become a more substantial actor in Africa – a strategy
that is not beholden to the standards of democracy and human rights that other
external actors, namely the EU and US, often purport to induce across the continent.
With this impunity, it becomes increasingly di cult for actors opposed to Russia to
call out instances of direct support for authoritarian regimes, while the Russian regime
can use more severe methods of control and support in recipient countries, including
in icting human rights violations.
For the West, this is not a situation with a simple solution. The continued use of
private military contractors such as the Wagner Group is signi cant and challenging
because of the veils of disinformation and deniability that surround its origins,
leadership and day-to-day operations. Efforts to uncover the hierarchy of leadership in
Wagner and other mercenary groups, such as Bellingcat’s report and the contributions
scholars have made in conjunction with independent Russian media, are steps
towards de nitive proof of Prigozhin’s involvement and funding. However, the growth
of private military groups in executing the orders of autocracy-supporting states, such
as Russia, is under-researched and under-reported, leading to a signi cant knowledge
gap in the ways authoritarian forms of government can be supported abroad.
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